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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of external financing needs on both firm value and 
corporate governance mechanisms within the UK SME context. This framework is of 
importance because of the limited external financial resources SMEs might face.We consider 
the endogeneity problem between corporate governance mechanisms and firm value, and 
hence, the three stages least squares (3SLS, hereafter) and the Instrumental Variables (IV, 
hereafter) based on Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS, hereafter) estimation methods are 
employed.We find a positive relationship between external financing needs and firm value. In 
addition, we detect that size and profitability are positively associated with firm value in our 
sample. Concerning the corporate governance index, we detect that big SMEs and those with 
low debt levels have better corporate governance structures.  
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Introduction 
There has been a growing body of literature on the relationship between firm value and 
corporate governance. For example, Chen et al. (2010) stress the importance of the effect of 
external funding on corporate governance and firm value. Using Gompers et al.’s (2003) 
index, they report that corporate governance affects firm value. Most of the studies relate to 
large firms, with limited evidence on SMEs.  Different studies, such as Al-Najjar (2015), 
Belghitar and Khan (2013), and Michaelas et al. (1999), provide evidence that the finance 
theory is applied in the SME context.  
   Given the importance of SMEs in the UK, as they represent the major employer of the UK 
market, we are interested in providing the first evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value within the listed UK SMEs. To tackle the issues related 
to SME data, this study is interested in investigating publicly traded SMEs. These firms 
provide full financial statements, and in turn, most of their corporate governance and 
financial data are available. From 2550 SMEs across all industries (included in the FAME 
database), we find that only those publicly traded firms provide the required information. 
These SMEs follow different recommendations of good governance practices (such as The 
Cadbury Report (1992)); for example, they appoint independent directors and have board 
sub-committees, and hence, they are keen to minimise information asymmetry.  The premise 
of this study is to investigate the effect of external financing needs on firm value and 
corporate governance, as this factor (external financing needs) is very important for SMEs 
given the limited sources of external funding they might face. 
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   We adopt a corporate governance index for the UK SMEs that is constructed using 10 
corporate governance variables, and we examine its relationship to firm value. We also 
examine factors that may affect corporate governance mechanisms by applying different 
models, including logistic modelling. This paper adds to the extant literature in several 
dimensions. First, we test for the relationship between firm value and the corporate 
governance index. In addition, this paper focuses on the under-researched context of UK 
listed SMEs. Moreover, we include ownership structure factors to investigate their impact on 
firm value. The findings show no evidence linking the corporate governance index and 
improved firm value in our sample. This result can be explained by the weak role of 
governance mechanisms in UK SMEs. Nevertheless, we provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between external financing needs and firm value. Concerning firm-specific 
factors, firm size and profitably are positively related to firm value. Furthermore, we detect 
some evidence of relationship between firm value and corporate governance. Finally, we 
report that large SMEs have better corporate governance mechanisms. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review; 
Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses; Section 4 discusses the 
development of the corporate governance index; Section 5 describes the data and 
methodology; Section 6 reports the findings; and Section 7 concludes. 
Literature Review 
Prior studies emphasise the association between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
value in large firms. Gompers et al. (2003) developed a corporate governance index that has 
been widely used in different studies (see for example, Chen et al., 2010). They argue that 
firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms have more firm value and, consequently, 
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a higher level of sales. However, contradicting the results of Gompers et al. (2003), Chen et 
al. (2010) document a negative association between the governance index and firm value.  
Regarding the relationship among the need for external financing, firm value, and corporate 
governance, it is argued that a high level of outside financing enhances firms’ corporate 
governance structures. As stated by Durnev and Kim (2005), highly profitable firms are seen 
to adopt good corporate governance frameworks. This is because such firms utilise more 
internal resources and less outside financial resources. However, based on the assumptions of 
Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2010) find evidence that external financing should be 
bound within a minimum level of cash flow rights. Therefore, firms with profitable 
investment opportunities are anticipated to increase outside financing to exhibit proper 
corporate governance viability. This is because investment opportunities are likely to reflect 
good corporate governance practices (see Durnev and Kim, 2005). Myers and Majluf (1984) 
argue that firms with positive investment incentives are more likely to increase outside 
financing costs due to asymmetric information. Chung (2006) posits that a good corporate 
governance framework is a tool to reduce information asymmetries. Firms with good 
governance practices are in a position to reduce external financing costs and, hence, increase 
firm value. Therefore, we stress the important effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm value and outside financing costs.  
Ownership structure also has an important effect on firm value. Agency problems arise 
when managers are involved in the process of pursuing self-incentive interests instead of 
working for the benefit of shareholders. However, firms can mitigate such problems by 
improving shareholders’ rights because they are in a better position to control management 
and, hence, divert managers’ self-pursuing interests. In so doing, firm value will increase as a 
result of strong monitoring of shareholders over managers.  
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 Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest the existence of converging interests between 
managers and shareholders as a result of a high level of ownership. This is because with 
higher ownership levels, directors can monitor management more effectively and thus 
reduce agency costs, which in turn will increase firm value. In the UK context, Short and 
Keasey (1999) and Weir et al. (2002) find evidence of a non-linear relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. High levels of institutional ownership will lead 
to greater control and monitoring over management, which will lead to better firm 
performance and value. Consistent with this argument, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) posit 
that external ownership is positively associated with firm performance.  
Several studies have investigated the factors affecting firm value, more specifically, firm-
level factors. Such factors include firm size, profitability, debt and investment 
opportunities. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) regress Tobin’s Q on ownership 
structure variables and firm-specific factors including leverage and firm size. They find that 
a higher percentage of insider ownership helps enhance firm value. Regarding the firm level 
aspect, they document a negative association between size and leverage on firm value, 
arguing that less corporate debt improves firm performance.  
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) adopt Gompers et al.’s (2003) corporate governance index and 
find that it affects operating performance in a positive fashion. Other evidence of firm value 
and corporate governance is put forward by Bebchuk et al. (2009), who analyse the effect 
of Gompers et al.’s (2003) corporate governance index on firm value. They also include 
firm-specific factors such as profitability, firm size, and leverage in their model with 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. They document a positive relationship between 
corporate governance index and firm value, suggesting that firms with a better corporate 
governance index are likely to improve their firm performance. They further posit that a 
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lower debt level enhances firm value. As for firm size, inconclusive results are obtained.  
Finally, Al-Najjar (2015), using a sample of UK SMEs, detects no relationship between the 
corporate governance index and SMEs’ cash holdings decisions. In addition, Belghitar and 
Khan (2013) investigate the relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings in 
SMEs and report that UK SMEs with institutional investors and greater volatility in their cash 
flows hold more cash. 
Because the focus of this paper is the need for external financing, it is argued that firms 
with external financing needs provide incentives for investment opportunities, thus increasing 
firm value.  
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis development 
The theoretical basis regarding corporate governance and external financing needs draws on 
different dimensions. Concerning firm value, there are several discussions as to how 
corporate governance mechanisms affect firm value. Good corporate governance practices 
help enhance firm value and performance. The inclusion of outside financing needs involves 
the availability of investment opportunities for the firm, which will consequently increase 
firm value.  
The first theoretical foundation regarding the relationship between external finances and 
firm value is the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Different studies have 
investigated this theory in the SME context (see, for example, Al-Najjar, 2015). Asymmetric 
information between management and external investors leads firms to follow a specific 
pattern to finance their projects. The first and cheapest option for the firm is retained 
earnings, then issuing debt and, as a last resort, issuing equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
cost of external financing (in the presence of information asymmetry) is higher than the cost 
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of internal funds. Firms with external financing use investment opportunities that are 
available to them. This induces firms with profitable investment opportunities to enhance 
corporate governance practices and consequently improve their value. 
Proper corporate governance mechanisms can stand as a platform to mitigate costs of 
capital related to outside financing. Hence, outside financing opportunities with good 
corporate governance practices can affect firm value.   
Another perspective is agency theory, which has been examined in the SME context in 
different papers. Al-Najjar (2015) argues that this theory is applied in the SME context 
since SMEs have information opacity that creates more information asymmetry problems 
for such firms. In the presence of information asymmetry, there is a high likelihood that 
such firms will face agency costs. These costs are related to conflicts of interest arising 
between management and shareholders. Agency conflicts prevail in situations where 
managers are inclined to pursue their own interests instead of maximising shareholders’ 
wealth. Managers tend to pursue their objectives in cases where such objectives increase 
their status, salary and other advantages in enhancing their company’s positions (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, firms can mitigate agency conflicts by adopting good 
corporate governance mechanisms. These mechanisms can be internal and external and can 
involve board structure, ownership structure, and sub-committee structure. In this study, we 
rely on the agency framework in associating corporate governance aspects and outside 
financing to firm value. This enables us to understand how corporate governance 
mechanisms are linked to external financing needs and firm value in UK listed SMEs.  
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Hence, different theoretical frameworks explain how corporate governance and outside 
financing needs can influence firm value (Chen et al., 2010). We borrow this framework 
from large firms, since different studies, such as Al-Najjar (2015), Belghitar and Khan 
(2013), and Michaelas et al. (1999), find that the finance theory is applied in the SME 
context, and related theories have been examined in different aspects within the SME context. 
In this section, we put forward a discussion of the investigated variables. We start with the 
corporate governance index, followed by external finance. Finally, we discuss the control 
variables (firm-specific factors). 
Corporate Governance Index 
As mentioned earlier, this study adopts a corporate governance index with the available 
corporate governance information of UK SMEs. The index shows that the higher the scale, 
the better the corporate governance mechanisms. It is argued that a positive relationship is 
expected between the corporate governance index and Tobin’s Q. Gompers et al. (2003), 
using their corporate governance index, find that firms with strong corporate governance 
mechanisms have more firm value and higher sales. However, Chen et al. (2010) document a 
negative association between the corporate governance index and firm value. Using a 
governance index, Bebchuk et al. (2009) provide evidence that the firm entrenchment index 
fully drives the relation between firm value and the governance index. Cremers and Nair 
(2005) find that the ‘‘external governance index’’ impedes firm performance and valuation. 
Given the contradictory arguments and the endogeneity between the corporate governance 
index and firm value, we posit the following: 
H1 (a): There is a relationship between the corporate governance index (CGI) and firm 
value. 
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H1 (b): There is a relationship between firm value and the corporate governance index. 
 External Financing Needs 
External financing needs are also defined as outside financing. This factor has been used in 
previous empirical studies, such as Demirgüç-kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Durnev and Kim 
(2005) and Chen et al. (2010). All of these studies define the need for external financing as 
the difference between the annual growth rate and the sustainable growth rate, where the 
sustainable growth rate is calculated as the ratio of (ROE/1-ROE). Thus, if a firm’s external 
financing needs are positive, a value of 1 is assigned, and 0 otherwise. 
Profitable firms have more internally generated funds and will rely less on external 
funding (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). Durnev and Kim (2005) suggest that 
firms with high “profitable investment opportunities” will tend to have better corporate 
governance practices. 
 We adopt the approach of Chen et al. (2010) and Durnev and Kim (2005) and argue that 
profitable investment opportunities generate more external financing, and thus, firms with 
more external financing opportunities tend to have better corporate governance.  Hence, we 
posit the following hypotheses:  
H2 (a): There is a positive association between external financing needs and firm value.  
H2 (b): There is a positive relationship between external financing needs and the 
corporate governance index. 
Ownership Structure 
A large body of research discusses the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
value (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; and Morck et al., 
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1988). McConnell and Servaes (1990) indicate that the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm value is an inverted U-shape. If the ownership level increases, the firm 
value is likely to improve. At a certain point, however, the firm value falls even if the level of 
ownership is high. Faccio and Lasfer (1999) find a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value for US firms. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) observe a positive 
association for a US sample, as do McConnell and Servaes (1990). Other studies, such as 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), have not found any significant link. The presence of 
institutions is beneficial, as they serve as a platform in alleviating agency problems arising 
between managers and shareholders. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between institutional/ managerial ownership and firm 
value. 
Firm-Specific Variables (control variables) 
The following firm-specific variables are controlled for:  
Firm Size: We use the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. If firms are 
large in size, they are more diversified, and hence, their value is likely to increase. Large 
firms normally have a large asset base, which can be utilised for investment opportunities and 
maximising firm value. Baek et al. (2004) report a positive relationship between firm size and 
firm value. Also, Chen et al. (2010) document a positive association between size and 
Tobin’s Q. A positive relationship is also expected between firm size and corporate 
governance mechanisms. This is because large firms have greater opportunities to enhance 
their corporate governance frameworks.  
Leverage: We use the ratio of short-term debt to total assets as our leverage indicator. Debt 
can help enhance firm performance (see, for example, Chen et al., 2010). Stulz (1990) argue 
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that leverage provides incentives for management to increase value. In assessing the effect of 
debt structure on the corporate governance index, it is argued that less corporate debt will 
eventually lead to higher viability in corporate governance. 
Capital Expenditures Ratio: We employ the ratio of capital expenditures to sales as a proxy 
for investment opportunities (see, Berger and Ofek, 1995; Chen et al., 2010). We argue that 
firms with good investment opportunities employ proper corporate governance mechanisms 
(see Durnev and Kim, 2005).  
Profitability:  We use the ratio of earnings before interest and tax over sales as our 
profitability index. Prior studies, such as Berger and Ofek (1995), use a similar measure. It is 
argued that highly profitable firms are likely to have higher values (Chen et al., 2010).  
The Development of a Corporate Governance Index (CGIndex) 
We adopt the approach of Al-Najjar (2015) for an SME corporate governance index based on 
different corporate governance variables, namely, board size, board independence, board 
meetings, audit size, audit independence, audit meetings, existence of the remuneration 
committee, remuneration committee independence, existence of the nomination committee 
and nomination committee independence. The corporate governance index is assessed from a 
scale of 0 to 10. If a firm in a year meets all of the components of the corporate governance 
index then, it is assigned an index of 10; and for firms that have not met any of the criteria 
sustained in the index a value of 0 is assigned. The construction of the index is based on the 
recommendations of The Cadbury Report (1992) and The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010).  
In cases where there is no specific indication of the recommended views on corporate 
governance details, the average of the variable is taken, where if a firm’s governance 
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indicator is greater than the overall average of the sample’s indicator, a value of 1 is assigned, 
and 0 otherwise.  We employ this criterion for board size, as the evidence indicates that the 
larger the board, the better the performance. Larmous and Vafeas (2010) detect a positive 
association between board size and firm value, and thus, large boards will lead to higher firm 
value. Coles et al. (2008) argue that the benefit of having larger boards is that it enables firms 
to develop better advisory control terms. Board meetings: we argue that board meetings serve 
as a better index for the internal monitoring role, since firms can adopt new board meeting 
policies easier than changing their size or structure. Vafeas (1999) supports this point of 
view, and Lasfer (2002) argues that the higher board diligence infers more monitoring 
capacity in enhancing firm value. Nomination independence: independent directors serving 
on the board or sub-committees will improve the monitoring mechanisms. Concerning sub-
committees, Klein (1998) posits that remuneration committees set an overview of 
remuneration plans for senior management; a value of 1 is given to firms having a 
remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise (the same criterion is adopted for the nomination 
committee). We suggest that the presence of these committees will improve firms’ 
monitoring.  
Following the recommendations of The Cadbury Report (1992) and The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010), an independent board should be composed of a minimum of 3 
independent directors: “all boards will require a minimum of three non-executive directors” 
(Sec 4.11: 22). Also, “there should be a minimum of three members” for audit committee size 
(Sec 4.35 (a): 28). As far as audit independence is concerned, the following is recommended: 
“the board should establish an audit committee of at least three or in the case of small 
companies two independent non-executive directors” (Sec C.3.1: 19). Hence, because the 
emphasis of the paper is on SMEs, two non-executive directors are taken as the benchmark 
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for audit independence. Regarding the frequency of audit meetings, The Cadbury Report 
indicates that “meetings shall be held not less than twice in a year” (Annex 4, Cadbury 
Report). Furthermore, it is mentioned that “in the case of smaller companies’ two 
independent non-executive directors” should be on the remuneration committee (Sec D.2.1: 
23). Firms that meet these recommendations are given 1 and zero otherwise. Finally, we 
assign a corporate governance index for each firm on an annual basis, wherever corporate 
governance details are disclosed.  
We present summary statistics of the corporate governance variables used in the 
construction of the corporate governance index. From Table 1, on average, 6 directors form 
the board in our sample. Concerning the audit characteristics, we find that audit size has a 
mean of 2 members on the audit committee, which is in line with The Cadbury Report 
(1992). In addition, audit independence is in line with the recommendations of the Report 
that the board should be mainly composed of independent directors. Furthermore, the 
average number of meetings is 2, which is in line with the meeting frequency of audit 
committees recommended in The Cadbury Report. Other information about sub-
committees, such as the nomination committee, indicates that, on average, 2 members are 
on the committee. Regarding the nomination committee’s independence, there is a high 
level of independent directors on the committee board.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Data and Methodology 
Data  
Our sample consists of UK listed SMEs that meet the criteria of The British Department of 
Trade and Industry and is based on The Company’s Act 2006 and Collis (2008). According to 
the turnover and the number of employees, the new thresholds for the number of employees 
should be within 50 and 250 employees, and the turnover should be within £6.5m to £25.9m 
(for the years 2008 and 2009) (see Collis, 2008).  Before 2008, the number of employees 
should be within the range of 50 to 250, and the turnover should be within £5.6m and 
£22.8m.  The final sample derived, after satisfying such criteria, is 307 firms, after excluding 
34 financial-related firms. 
We use different sources to collect our data: FAME, DataStream, firms’ annual reports and 
the Thomson One Banker database. Financial data are collected from FAME and DataStream 
for the period 2000 to 2009. Information about shares owned by directors, board meetings, 
and audit meetings are hand-collected from firms’ annual reports. Other corporate 
governance characteristics, such as board structure and sub-committees, are collected from 
Thomson One Banker.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the variables applied in the analysis. We find that our 
sample has an average Tobin’s Q of approximately 55%. The variable of interest, which is 
the corporate governance index (CGIndex), has a mean of 3.3, ranging from a minimum of 0 
to a maximum of 10, which is not high. One explanation is that we are dealing with SMEs 
that do not provide all information regarding corporate governance. On average, external 
financing needs have a mean of 0.526. This indicates that, on average, the external financing 
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needs of UK SMEs stand at approximately 53%. Interestingly, there is a low level of 
managerial ownership in the sample, with a mean of 20.1%. However, institutional 
ownership shows a higher percentage, with a mean of 41.6%. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables employed in the study. We find 
that the correlation coefficients are not high, and hence, multicollinearity is not a concern in 
our models. 
Methodology 
To investigate whether external financing needs affect corporate governance and firm value 
within the UK SME context, we employ different techniques to provide an in-depth analysis. 
To consider the endogeneity problem between the corporate governance index and firm 
value, we employ 3SLS and an instrumental variable (IV) based on 2SLS estimation 
methods. The Hausman test indicates that there is significant evidence of endogeneity in 
some of our models. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) posit that corporate 
governance characteristics in a regression analysis lead to the endogeneity problem. 
Therefore, the three stages least squares (3SLS, hereafter) and the Instrumental Variables (IV, 
hereafter) based on Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS, hereafter) estimation methods will 
provide robust results. The following model is adopted: 
Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1CGIndexit + β2EFNit + β3MOwnit + β4InstOwnit + β5Sizeit + β6Levit  
+ β7EBITSit + εit 
Where Tobin’s Q it is calculated as the market value of common equity plus the book 
value of preferred equity and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets; CGIndex 
is an index for each firm i in year t scaling from 0 to 10; EFN is a dummy variable that 
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takes 1 for firms with a positive difference between annual growth rate and sustainable 
growth rate, and 0 otherwise; MOwn is the ratio of the number of ordinary shares outstanding 
outstanding held by directors to the total number of shares outstanding; InstOwn is closely 
held shares from institutions; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Lev is the ratio of 
short-term debt to total assets; EBITS is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to sales; 
and ε it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
The second model is also regressed using the OLS, 3SLS, and IV approaches. The 
regression model is set as follows: 
CGIndexit = β0 + β1 Tobin’sqit+ β2EFNit + β3Sizeit + β4Levit + β5Capexit + εit 
 
The variables are as defined previously with the exception of Capex, which is the ratio of 
capital expenditures to sales, and ε it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
We provide further evidence by conducting additional tests. First, we introduce a new 
variable by partitioning the sample based on the corporate governance index by taking its 
average and dividing the sample between those firms with a better or worse corporate 
governance index (BCGI). In so doing, we estimate the following model: 
Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1BCGIit + β2EFNit + β3MOwnit + β4InstOwnit + β5Sizeit + β6Levit + β7Capexit + 
εit 
 
Furthermore, we use a non-linear approach, namely, a logistic technique to examine which 
factors affect firms with a better or worse corporate governance index (CGI).  
BCGIit = β0 + β1Tobin’s Qit + β2EFNit + β3Sizeit + β4Levit + β5Capexit + εit 
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Where BCGI is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for firms having a BCGI greater 
than average, and 0 otherwise. The other variables are previously defined; εit is the error 
term for firm i in year t. 
We follow the argument of Aivazian et al. (2006:445) that “the simultaneity problem is 
much reduced when the dependent variables are qualitative rather than continuous”. 
Hence, we estimate these models using logit and OLS estimators. 
 
Results 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of three different models. Model 1 is regressed using 
pooled OLS; Model 2 applies IV estimation with 2SLS; and Model 3 uses a 3SLS technique. 
In panel A, we investigate the factors that affect firm value (which is measured by Tobin’s 
Q). In Panel B, we examine whether our variables of interest (that is, external financing needs 
and Tobin’s Q) can affect the corporate governance index in UK SMEs. R2 is not reported, as 
it infers no statistical meaning in 2SLS or 3SLS, as maintained by Goldberger (1991). 
Throughout the three models, the coefficient of external financing needs is significant and 
positive, which indicates that firms with more outside financing have better firm value. This 
finding is consistent with Chen et al. (2010). This strong evidence indicates that UK SMEs 
with external financing needs enhance their value. However, we detect no evidence that 
corporate governance mechanisms enhance firm value. Also, ownership structure shows no 
impact on firm value. We can explain these results as follows: corporate governance 
mechanisms in UK SMEs are not active in monitoring firms, and, in turn, they do not 
improve firm value. Similar results are reported in the UK literature. For example, Guest 
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(2008) argues that independent directors in the UK are not as active as in the US, and Ozkan 
(2007) reports a weak link between independent directors and firms’ monitoring. 
Regarding firm-specific variables, the coefficient of size is positive and significant 
throughout the models. This shows that larger firms have more value because they are more 
diversified, and hence, size can enhance firm value. This is in accordance with the findings of 
Chen et al. (2010), who report a positive relationship between firm size and firm value. 
Profitability is positively associated with Tobin’s Q. This result is consistent with Chen et al. 
(2010). Concerning leverage, we find a weak negative association with firm value (Model 1), 
which explains why firms with high debt ratios are more likely to reduce their value. Similar 
results are documented by Chen et al. (2010). A plausible explanation may be that high debt 
ratios increase the likelihood of financial distress and thus lower firm value.  
In panel B, we investigate how external financing needs and firm-specific variables impact 
the corporate governance index. Our results show no evidence of a relationship between 
outside financing and the corporate governance index. Consistent with our hypothesis, the 
results show some positive evidence of a relationship between firm value and the corporate 
governance index, indicating that firms with better values are keen to adopt better governance 
mechanisms. The coefficient of firm size is positive and significant throughout the models, 
indicating that large firms that are more diversified have better corporate governance 
structures. Other variables, such as leverage, are found to be negatively associated with the 
corporate governance index, suggesting that firms with high debt ratios have weaker 
governance mechanisms.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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To provide more evidence on the effect of external financing needs on corporate 
governance and firm value, we run additional tests. The sample is split based on the average 
value of the corporate governance index, where firms with an higher than average index are 
categorised as having a better CGI, and vice versa. Two models are estimated as shown in 
Table 5. Model 1 applies pooled OLS, while Model 2 applies a logistic model.  
From Model 1, we report that outside financing positively affects firm value. This is 
consistent with the argument that firms involved in outside financing have more incentives 
in enhancing firm value. In addition, we find no evidence on the relationship between 
ownership structure and Tobin’s Q. Regarding the firm-specific variables, the results show 
a positive sign for size, leverage and capital expenditures. This shows that large firms with 
a better corporate governance structure improve their firm value. 
Leverage is positively associated with Tobin’s Q for firms with good corporate 
governance mechanisms. Such firms increase their debt behaviour for investment 
opportunity purposes, and hence, they are more likely to enhance their firm value. In Model 
2, we create a dummy variable categorising firms with a value of 1 as having a good 
corporate governance index and 0 otherwise. The results show that firm size is positively 
associated with the probability of adopting a good corporate governance structure.  Firms 
with low leverage tend to improve the likelihood of adopting a good corporate governance 
structure, perhaps because high leverage ratios may lead to financial distress. Finally, 
outside financing needs and firm value have no impact on a firm’s likelihood of adopting a 
good corporate governance structure. 
It is worth noting that when we re-estimate the models and include the squares of the 
institutional ownership and the managerial ownership to capture the non-linear relationship, 
we find that there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship of the ownership structure. The 
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results of the other variables are not substantially different from what we report in our tables.  
Concluding Remarks 
This paper is the first to assess the relationship between firm value and the corporate 
governance index in the UK SME context. We adopt a corporate governance index based on 
10 corporate governance features reported by the selected SMEs. The score is based on The 
Cadbury Report (1992) and The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). We investigate the 
impact of external financing needs on corporate governance framework and firm value.  
The findings indicate that outside financing needs are positively related to firm value. 
Nevertheless, we report no evidence of a relationship between the corporate governance 
index and firm value within our sample.  This indicates that SME governance mechanisms, in 
our sample, are not active, as in large firms. Therefore, policy makers in the UK need to draft 
rules and regulations for SMEs to encourage such monitoring practices. Regarding the factors 
affecting the corporate governance index, the results show that firms with high value enhance 
corporate governance tools, and hence, SMEs are encouraged to improve their governance 
mechanisms.   
There are a few limitations to this study. First, our sample is limited to listed firms. This is 
because of the availability of the required governance information. Other unlisted SME 
studies would improve our understanding of governance mechanisms in such a context. 
Second, our corporate governance index employs information provided in our sample. Other 
governance data (such as CEO characteristics and external governance tools) would improve 
our understanding of the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm value. 
Finally, adding new dimensions such as corporate social responsibility would be of interest in 
SMEs.   
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Several contributions are achieved in this study. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
to analyse the impact of external financing needs on the corporate governance index and 
firm value for UK SMEs. Also, new evidence is reported that outside financing needs 
increase SMEs’ value in the UK.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Corporate Governance Index 
Variables Observations Mean Minimum Maximum 
Bsize 2414 
 
6 1 21 
BoardInd 2414 
 
0 0 1 
BMeet 754 
 
9 2 20 
AudSize 1620 
 
2 1 4 
AudInd 1620 
 
1 0 1 
AudMeet 805 
 
2 1 6 
RemSize 1619 
 
2 1 6 
RemInd 1619 
 
1 0 1 
NomSize 841 
 
2 1 8 
NomInd 840 
 
1 0 2 
Bsize is defined as the number of directors on board; BoardInd is the ratio of non-executive 
directors to total number of board directors; BMeet is the total number of meetings; AudSize 
is the number of directors on audit committee; AudInd is defined as the ratio of directors to 
total number of directors on audit committee; AudMeet is the total number of audit meetings 
held in a year; RemSize is the total number of directors on remuneration committee; RemInd 
is the ratio of number of non-executive directors to total number of directors on remuneration 
committee; NomSize is the total number of directors on nomination committee; NomInd is 
the ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors on nomination committee 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Minimum Maximum 
Tobin’s Q 1222 
 
0.545 0 0.999 
CGIndex 3067 
 
3.313 0 10 
EFN 2314 
 
0.526 0 1 
Mown 1431 
 
0.201 0.000012 0.950 
InstOwn 2390 
 
0.416 0 1 
Size 2457 
 
9.521 1.386 14.974 
Lev 2447 
 
0.067 0 0.917 
Capex 2300 
 
0.067 0 1 
EBITS 2139 
 
-0.003 -1 0.946 
Note: Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of common equity plus the book value of 
preferred equity and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets.; CGIndex is the 
corporate governance index giving a value from 0 to 10 for firm i in year t; EFN is defined as 
external financing needs, which a dummy variable that gives a value of 1 for firms with a 
positive difference between annual growth rate and sustainable growth rate, 0 otherwise; 
MOwn is the ratio of number of ordinary shares outstanding held by directors to the total 
number of ordinary shares outstanding; InstOwn is closely held shares; Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of total assets; Lev is assessed as the ratio of short term debt to total assets; 
Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales; EBITS is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and tax over sales. 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
Variables Tobin’s 
Q 
CGIndex EFN MOwn InstOwn Size Lev Capex EBITS 
Tobin’s Q 1.000 
 
        
CGIndex 0.033 
 
1.000        
EFN 0.096 
 
-0.043 1.000       
Mown -0.043 
 
-0.248 -0.021 1.000      
InstOwn -0.015 
 
-0.215 0.031 0.453 1.000     
Size 0.090 
 
0.374 -0.168 -0.297 -0.235 1.000    
Lev 0.098 
 
-0.153 0.006 0.043 0.0009 -0.093 1.000   
Capex 0.114 
 
0.040 0.026 -0.126 -0.047 0.258 -0.018 1.000  
EBITS 0.085 
 
0.044 -0.253 0.057 0.068 0.118 -0.092 0.032 1.000 
Variables as defined in Table 3 
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Table 4 Regression Results on Firm Value & Corporate Governance Index 
Variables Pooled IV 3SLS 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable – Tobin’s 
Q 
 
   
CGIndex  0.0004 
(0.940) 
 
-0.112 
(0.191) 
-0.118 
(0.165) 
EFN  0.065** 
(0.001) 
 
  0.072** 
(0.018) 
 0.077** 
(0.011) 
Mown -0.015 
(0.831) 
 
-0.194 
(0.203) 
-0.054 
(0.706) 
InstOwn 0.010 
(0.866) 
 
-0.120 
(0.330) 
-0.016 
(0.886) 
Size  0.024** 
(0.044) 
 
  0.109* 
(0.107) 
 0.127* 
(0.057) 
Lev   0.260** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.077 
(0.790) 
-0.094 
(0.743) 
EBITS   0.160** 
(0.008) 
 
  0.162** 
(0.043) 
 0.162** 
(0.041) 
Constant   0.328** 
(0.011) 
0.134 
(0.556) 
-0.091 
(0.681) 
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Panel B: Dependent Variable – 
CGIndex 
 
Tobin’s Q   0.984** 
(0.012) 
 
-0.137 
(0.974) 
1.207 
(0.753) 
EFN -0.104 
(0.485) 
 
-0.010 
(0.960) 
0.062 
(0.822) 
Size   0.807*** 
(0.000) 
 
  0.918*** 
(0.000) 
 0.925*** 
(0.000) 
Lev  -2.435** 
(0.001) 
 
  -2.471* 
(0.059) 
 -3.251** 
(0.012) 
Capex -0.638 
(0.442) 
 
-0.692 
(0.597) 
-1.841 
(0.148) 
Constant  -4.301*** 
(0.000) 
 -4.580** 
( 0.009) 
 -4.875** 
(0.005) 
***, **, * significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively. Variables are defined in table 
3. 
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Table 5 Regression Results for Better CGIndex 
Variables Pooled Logit 
 Dependent Variable: Tobin’s 
Q 
Dependent Variable: BCGI =1 
if firm’s CGIndex is above 
average, 0 otherwise 
Tobin’s Q  0.495 
(0.127) 
BCGI -0.013 
(0.574) 
 
 
EFN  0.065** 
(0.001) 
 
0.044 
(0.745) 
Mown -0.018 
(0.810) 
 
 
InstOwn 0.006 
(0.917) 
 
 
Size  0.026** 
(0.027) 
 
 0.548*** 
(0.000) 
Lev  0.253** 
(0.003) 
 
-1.746* 
(0.072) 
Capex  0.402 
(0.599) 
 
Constant   0.322** 
(0.012) 
 -5.489*** 
(0.000) 
 
No. of Observations 615 1131 
F-Test
   3.90** 
(0.001) 
 
  38.02*** 
(0.000) 
R
2 0.0520 0.0789 
***, **, * significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively. Variables are defined in table 
3. 
 
